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 Abstract: Electronic voting is still a hot topic. You can mainly distinguish between three types of 
electronic voting, namely direct recording electronic voting devices in polling stations, scan based 
electronic voting systems, and remote electronic voting. In this paper we focus on the last category 
and in particular we discuss three dimensions that are specific for remote Internet voting. These are 
voter identification and authentication techniques, client-side voting software used to cast the vote 
and secure platform mechanisms to overcome vulnerabilities of the client used by the voter to cast 
her vote. We describe and analyze different implementations of each of these in the context of remote 
Internet voting, and assess their performance based on usability, security, costs, and maintenance 
issues. We identify combinations that cannot be applied at the same time and make 
recommendations for the application of particular implementations for specific types of elections.  
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1. Introduction 
Internet voting, website voting and online voting are terms used interchangeably to refer to situations 
where a voter can cast her vote using the Internet as a transmission medium. Within this context, 
according to Oppliger (2002), there are different implementations that can be provided such as poll-
site Internet voting, kiosk Internet voting and remote Internet voting1. Remote Internet voting, allows a 
voter to cast her vote from any location, whether from home or work on the selected election day(s). It 
is just required to have a device (in general a PDA, PC, or a laptop) that is connected to the Internet. 
This presents several benefits: It enables the voter to vote from a location and at a time of her choice, 
thus enhancing convenience and flexibility for the voter. Thus it could potentially increase voter 
turnout. Remote Internet voting, like any other type of electronic voting makes the tallying process 
faster and verification of results simpler for the electoral body, as well as leading to reduced costs, 
particularly in the long-term. 
There are several challenges in remote Internet voting which do not exist in other types of 
electronic voting. Consider that it is carried out in an uncontrolled environment not directly under the 
supervision of the electoral body or its officials and without a physical voting booth. In this scenario, 
the voter needs to be authenticated as an eligible voter over the Internet as no poll workers are 
around to check the voter’s ID card against the electoral register. Furthermore, the voter or a third 
party controls the environment including the place to cast the vote, the device to run the voting 
software and the software to communicate with the voting servers. Regarding the voting software, the 
voter might use a malicious one – either on purpose as she wants to sell her vote or without her 
knowledge. In addition, there exists the risk of malicious software such as viruses and Trojans on the 
voting device. The payload of both attacks is either to change the voter’s selection or to break the 
secrecy of the vote. In order to overcome these problems a lot of different solutions have been 
proposed. However, what is currently missing to our knowledge is a comprehensive list of the different 
solutions including a description of each approach and an analysis of the advantages and 
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 Another type of remote electronic voting is SMS voting which is not addressed in this paper. 
   
disadvantages combined with a comparison. In addition, statements regarding possible combinations 
and impossible ones are missing. As all this would be of great help for election bodies, we will fill this 
gap with this paper. Our comparison will focus on security and usability aspects as well as on 
additional costs and additional effort for maintenance.  
The paper is structured in the following way: In Sections 2 we discuss different authentication 
techniques in the context of remote Internet voting, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
implementation, and identify those approaches that are obviously not applicable for any type of 
election. Afterwards, in Section 3, different approaches for the client-side voting software and in 
Section 4, different mechanisms to overcome the secure platform problem are introduced and 
discussed. In each section we present an analysis of existing approaches where we compare the 
different approaches regarding security and usability requirements as well as the costs and the effort 
for maintenance. Finally, in Section 5, we summarize the paper, present our findings, and make 
recommendations for future work. 
2. Authentication Techniques 
The process of authentication aims to ensure that a voter is who they claim to be by verifying the 
stated identity. Every remote electronic voting system needs to implement identification and 
authentication techniques to ensure that only eligible voters can cast a vote and those only once. 
Thus, the voter needs to be electronically identified and authenticated. The identification must be 
unambiguous. This can be solved by name, surname, birthday, and/or social number or other unique 
numbers. Therefore, we only focus on the authentication technique in this paper. In information 
security, three types of authentication forms are known as well as a combination of the three: 
something you know (a password), something you have (a token), and something you are 
(fingerprint). In the following subsections, they are described and discussed in the context of remote 
Internet voting.  
a. Something You Know: a Secret 
The first category of authentication techniques is based on knowledge. There are two possible 
implementations while each can be applied in different ways: The first possible implementation of 
voter identification and authentication is applied in accordance with the setup of an e-mail account: in 
the election setup phase, voters create their voting accounts, which will later be used by the voters to 
cast their vote. Different from the e-mail account where – in general - everyone can create an email 
account on behalf of someone else, the voter needs to be authenticated beforehand as an eligible 
voter, e.g. at some central offices, and create the account afterwards at this central office. Otherwise 
it cannot be excluded that other persons who are not eligible for this particular election can set up an 
account. Correspondingly, this solution requires some additional effort from the voter as she needs to 
go to these central offices in the election setup phase. There are two possible settings; depending on 
the frequency of elections, voters might create a new account per election or can use the same 
account for several elections. 
Regarding vote casting, this approach is easy from the voter’s perspective as the voter is used to 
login/password authentication from many other Internet applications. However, it also has 
disadvantages: First of all, voters might choose weak passwords which can be easily hacked by an 
attacker or they might write their passwords down. Thus, friends or family members can get access to 
their password. Second, vote buying is not excluded because voters could send their login data 
electronically to a potential buyer. There is nearly no effort for the voter and it is free of charge to send 
an email to the potential buyer with this information. How realistic it is that voters forward their 
password to a potential buyer depends on whether the same account can be used for several 
elections or not. Probably, even if the same account is used for several elections the voter could ask 
to reset the password and, thus, the vote buyer from the last election cannot use the password she 
   
got from the last election for the next one. In addition, the probability that someone will pay for the 
account details is very low if vote updating is enabled. The problem for the buyer in this case is that 
she does not know whether the voter does not also cast a vote some seconds before the end of the 
election phase and thus overwrites her ‘bought’ vote. 
Another approach to implement authentication through knowledge of a secret is based on a so 
called voting TAN procedure. A voting TAN is a transaction number, similar to those used for online 
banking. The vote TAN is a unique code of several (more than four) letters and digits for each voter 
and is sent by post to eligible voters in the election setup phase. In general, the voter will get a new 
voting TAN for each election. Usually, the voting TAN is covered by a scratch field. Thus, if for 
example, the secretary opens the post for the boss, she does not get access to the voting TAN 
without being detected (by the destroyed scratch field). This variation is rather similar to the one 
above with respect to usability issues. The advantage is that the voter does not need to go to such a 
central office. Security increases as the voting TAN can be generated through the responsible 
election authority as a strong secret. However, the costs increase since the eligible voters get their 
voting TAN by mail. To ensure that no voter looses the right to vote you need either to trust the postal 
service and the printing service of the voting TANs or you need to implement procedures that enable 
voters to cast a paper vote in case they claim not to have received the voting TAN. Furthermore, you 
need to have a procedure to check that these voters do not cast two votes and regulations how to 
react if two votes have been cast. The risk that the TAN will be forwarded to an intruder in order to sell 
the vote still exists and depends on whether vote updating is enabled or not. For both these 
approaches there are no special maintenance requirements.  
b. Something You Have: a Token 
The second category of authentication techniques is based on ownership. Two different 
implementation possibilities can be identified for remote Internet voting: In one implementation, a new 
election specific authentication card is used, which will be sent to the voter prior to the election 
(similar to the TAN from the above category). Again a new card could be sent before each election or 
there is one card that is used for all later elections, too. Compared to the TAN solution this one 
provides more security since the buying of votes is more expensive because getting the card is more 
difficult than getting a copy of the TAN, for example, via email. However, as the card has no other 
purpose than casting a vote, people who do not care about the outcome of the election might forward 
the card to potential buyers. Different from the last approach, here, it does not help to enable vote 
updating. The costs for the election bodies rise substantially: apart from production and distribution 
costs of the smart cards, substantial costs of an appropriate card reader arise either for the voter or 
for the election bodies, too. From a usability perspective, negative effects will probably appear caused 
by the necessary installation of the card reader and corresponding software on the voter’s PC.  
In the second implementation, a pre-existing authentication card is used, which the voter already 
owns and uses for authentication purposes in other areas, like her ID card, job card or library card. 
Thus, someone who has this card obtains access to other services too and is not just enabled to cast 
a vote on behalf of the card owner. Correspondingly, such a card will not be lightly passed on to a 
vote buyer, since this automatically means that all other applications of the card are passed on as 
well. Additionally, the use of an already-owned card increases the user-friendliness (at least a bit) as 
the voter might also be used to authenticating himself with this card. However, the costs of the card 
reader remain if the voter does not yet possess such a device. From our perspective, the user-
friendliness will not really be increased as such cards are usually used for authentication at terminals 
(to enter rooms, borrow books, pay lunch in the canteen, and so on) and not at own devices. 
Therefore, the installation effort remains as well as the costs to buy and distribute the readers. 
Regarding maintenance, the effort increases for both solutions compared to the implementation of 
   
authentication techniques based on secrets as there is software, drivers, and a device at the voter’s 
place which need to be maintained, in addition to the components on the server side.  
c. Something You Are: Biometrics 
The third authentication category is based on biometric attributes2. Examples of biometric attributes 
are fingerprints, iris scans, face recognition (size and position of different facial features), voice (mode 
and tone while speaking), manual signature (form and dynamic aspects), and DNA. The form or 
structure of each of these attributes is unique per person. In order to authenticate a person the 
corresponding attribute is scanned. The scanned copy of the attribute is then compared to the one 
stored for the subject. In case it matches, the subject is authorized, otherwise she is rejected. The 
main advantage of biometric authentication is that attributes cannot be forwarded to another person, 
for instance, vote buyers. Therefore, from a security point of view, it does not need to distinguish 
between systems that are already deployed and those that are introduced for the election. However, 
from the cost and user-friendliness point of view it would make a difference. Unfortunately, the 
matching of scanned and stored data does not work perfectly: the system can falsely reject an 
authorized subject, or it can falsely accept an unauthorized subject. Therefore, each system has a 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) and a False Acceptance Rate (FAR). In the past, the FRR has been 
disregarded as FAR is much more important for privacy and integrity issues. In elections, availability 
is (because of the universal election principle) as important as other properties. In addition, a major 
point of concern for a biometric system is how to securely store such sensitive data and due to data 
protection requirements it is not recommended to store biometric data from all voters in a central 
database. However, there is no other solution if you do not want to combine this approach with other 
authentication techniques. Another disadvantage involves the costs for introducing such an approach 
for elections because large-scale biometric infrastructures in general do not exist, yet. Furthermore, 
every voter would need a reader at her place, corresponding software and drivers. Regarding usability 
issues, this of course has the consequence that people need to be able to install the corresponding 
software and drivers.  
d. Combinations of Different Techniques 
Often, a combination of the above listed authentication techniques is used. The most popular ones 
are the combination ownership/secrecy in signature cards, especially if used for qualified digital 
signatures, and ownership/property to store the sensitive biometric data on a smart card instead of in 
a central database. The idea would be similar in both cases. The smart card needs to be enabled 
before it can be used for authentication purposes. This is done either by a PIN code or by the 
scanned biometric data. The application of these combinations maximizes the security because in 
both cases it is hard to fake the card. In the case of the biometric properties, a vote buyer cannot use 
a voter’s card because she cannot enable the card without the biometric data from the voter. In the 
other case this risk in general exists. However, if such a card is used for several applications, 
forwarding the card means giving someone else the opportunities to get access to other data and 
applications or to legally sign any document. Neither of these two implementations is widely 
distributed. There are contexts and countries where the combination of smart card and PIN is widely 
spread as the ID card is such a card. However, even in these contexts, the corresponding 
functionality is not used as users have no corresponding card readers at home. This means that there 
might be no costs to develop, build, and distribute such cards but still the card readers need to be 
bought, distributed, and installed. Regarding maintenance, the additional effort is similar to simply 
using cards and a reader for authentication. 
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 Biometrics and their applicability to electronic voting is discussed in detail in (Hof, 2004) 
   
e. Comparison 
The above discussion shows that there does not exist ‘the’ best solution if you analyze the 
approaches according to the aspects usability, costs, security, and maintenance effort. There are 
solutions that are more likely to apply than others however the decision for which solution to go for 
should also depend on the environment in which the system will be used in (e.g. is there already a 
public key infrastructure or other authentication techniques deployed) and the type and importance of 
the election as the risk of a manipulation for an election in societies is different from the one for 
federal elections). An overview of the above analysis is displayed in figure 1 (level 5 is the optimum 
one can reach). 
 
Figure 1: Authentication techniques and their applicability for remote Internet voting 
3. Client-Side Voting Software 
The client-side voting software is essential for the voter to communicate with the voting server. The 
client-side voting software runs on the vote-casting device. It can either be a web browser, a specific 
application – a so called rich client, or a particular voting applet – a so called thin client which can be 
run in the Web browsers. These three different approaches are proposed and discussed in the 
following subsections.  
a. Web Browser Solution 
One possibility to enable the voter to communicate with the voting server is the application of 
available Web browsers without any specific client-side voting software. This approach does not 
involve any kind of java applet. Due to the poor security functionalities of a Web browser, the main 
security mechanisms of the voting system run on the voting server. The Web browser is only used to 
establish the link to the voting server, to display the voting Web page, and for the voter to interact with 
the voting server including authentication of the voter and vote casting. The only assumed security 
functionality is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). This is necessary to secure the communication 
because Web browsers do not provide another possibility to encrypt or sign messages. Using SSL, it 
is possible to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged messages. Moreover, the 
authenticity of the voting server can be ensured. Note, this can only be ensured with the help of the 
voter who needs to check the voting server’s certificate.  
From a usability perspective, the Web browser solution is welcomed because the voter does not 
need to install additional software but can use the environment she is used to. Moreover, Web 
browsers are executable on other devices, other than normal PCs or notebooks. The voter can also 
   
use her WAP mobile phone or PDA to cast her vote using the remote Internet voting system. The only 
disadvantage from the usability point of view is the necessity for the voter to check the certificate of 
the voting server. This might be new for many voters even if they use SSL on a daily basis. To 
improve the situation it might help to use so called extended validation certificates. Concentrating the 
whole functionality on the server-side has two more advantages: first of all, in the case of a voting 
system update there is no effort for the voter because only the server-side voting software needs to 
be updated. Secondly, if a new Web browser or a new version of an existing Web browser is 
deployed the server-side voting software can be patched in order to support this new Web browser as 
well. Thus, the voter is free to choose the Web browser she prefers3 to cast her vote.  
However, there are two main disadvantages: first, the remote Internet voting system has no 
possibility to check the trustworthiness of the vote-casting device, for example, whether there is a 
virus or Trojan horse on the vote-casting device which affects the communication between the voter 
and the voting server. Moreover, an (un-patched) Web browser could weaken the trustworthiness by 
well-known exploits. The second disadvantage is caused by poor Web browser functionality. Thus, 
most of the proposed voting protocols cannot be implemented because this would require security 
functionality on the client-side. For the same reason, this approach can only be used in combination 
with secrets as authentication techniques.  
b. Rich-Client Solution 
This second approach is called rich-client because the client-side voting software is rich with 
respect to security functionality including the implementation of different cryptographic algorithms. 
This client-side voting software needs to be installed and executed on the vote-casting device in order 
to cast a vote. Any available voting protocol can be implemented using the rich-client approach, thus, 
in contrast to the Web browser solution; this solution does not exclude any voting protocol or any 
authentication technique. In addition, a rich-client can include a virus scanner or similar security 
software in order to verify the trustworthiness of the vote-casting device before starting the vote 
casting process as proposed in (Jones, 2002). Note, the voter needs to agree and may also not want 
voting software searching her file system for viruses or the like (for fears about privacy or the federal 
Trojan horse). 
The disadvantages of this approach are the distribution, installation, and maintenance of the client-
side voting software. Distribution and maintenance is an economic question while the installation is 
assigned to usability issues. Moreover, the client-side voting software might only run on a particular 
system if corresponding system properties are given (for example, the java virtual machine is 
running). Analogous to the validation of the server certificate in the Web browser approach, the voter 
needs to verify the integrity and authenticity of the voting software she installed on her vote-casting 
device. This is even more complicated for voters than the verification of a server certificate. 
c. Thin-Client Solution 
The Web browser solution is preferable from a usability and maintenance aspect whereas the rich-
client is advantageous from a flexibility and security point of view. A mix of both strong points is 
provided by the thin-client approach.  In this approach, a java applet is implemented to run in the Web 
browser. This java applet is the client-side voting software which provides the necessary security 
functionality on the client-side. The thin client approach offers several advantages. Any authentication 
technique and voting protocol can be implemented. Maintenance is easier since only the server-side 
software needs to be updated. It is easier to support new web browsers and new versions of web 
browsers. Furthermore it is easy to use, no software installation is required, it can be used with other 
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 Even more, the voter needs to be free to choose a Web browser she wants to use; a particular one cannot be 
mandated by the responsible election authority 
   
voting devices and the voter is free to use a web browser of their liking. However, Java Script has to 
be enabled. 
d. Comparison 
Similar to the discussion of the dimension ‘authentication technique’, the above discussion shows 
that there exists no best solution for the communication between voters and the voting server if you 
analyze the existing approaches according to the aspects usability, costs, security, and maintenance 
effort. All solutions have been applied for real remote Internet voting while the solution that was most 
likely in use is the thin client approach. Here you should have in mind for your decision that even the 
web browser solution provides the best usability you cannot combine it with either existing 
cryptographic voting protocols or any authentication techniques other than secret based. An overview 
of the above analysis is displayed in Figure 2 (level 5 is the optimum one can reach). 
 
Figure 2: Approaches for the client-side and their applicability for elections 
4. Secure Platform Mechanisms  
The Internet is considered an insecure environment. As mentioned, running elections over the 
Internet presents several challenges including the possibility of malicious software on the vote casting 
device modifying a voter's vote without their knowledge or breaking the secrecy of the vote. In order 
to run an election one needs to overcome this so called secure platform problem. In this section we 
discuss and analyze several approaches which have been proposed to overcome this problem.  
a. Guidelines 
A first approach to address the secure platform problem is the provision of special guidelines 
explaining to voters how they can improve the trustworthiness of their vote-casting device. Examples 
are the guidelines provided by the Swiss government for the remote Internet project and those 
developed by the German society of computer scientists (GI, 2010). This approach can reduce the 
risks created by malware on the vote-casting device. However, you probably mainly overcome 
standard and well known attacks. In addition, one cannot force voters to apply the security checks 
from the guidelines and many voters are not likely to be able to follow the instructions. Moreover, such 
an approach is useless against malicious voters installing malware on purpose. Regarding usability, 
one can say that the probability is very high that voters do not follow the instructions because these 
are additional steps or they are simply not able to do so (depending on which instructions are included 
in the guidelines). The costs are not very high as you only need to develop a list of instructions and 
then send it via email or put it on the election web page. Similarly, the maintenance effort is low as 
only the ‘piece of paper’ needs to be updated. 
   
b. Bootable CD 
Another approach to overcome the secure platform problem was proposed by Otten (2005). She 
recommended developing a special voting operating system based on Knoppix. Knoppix is an 
operating system based on Debian that is designed to be booted and run directly from a CD or DVD. 
Such a CD would then be distributed to the voters. After having received the CD, voters need to 
configure their vote casting device in a way that it boots from this CD. Probably, additional security 
checks are required from the voter to overcome the risk to have received a malicious CD which 
communicates with a malicious server with the consequence that the vote can be altered before it is 
cast to the proper voting server and the secrecy of the vote can be violated. A main challenge of this 
approach is to develop a CD that boots from all the different hardware around and can be 
automatically connected to the Internet with all the different providers available. Probably the voter 
needs to take additional steps to configure the Internet connection. Note, even if all this could be 
solved this approach does not solve the malicious voter problem as it only prevents attacks caused by 
malware. Voters could for example install additional malware on top of the system booted from CD. 
The answer to the question depends on the quality of the CD. If the voter needs to do a lot of 
configurations, the approach is not very user-friendly but if the operation system does everything 
without the voters help it would be a user-friendly approach. Regarding cost, there are high 
development costs and the CDs need to be distributed to the voter in a secure way. This CD needs to 
be updated for the next election or for one of the next elections (depending on the time frame 
between two elections) and a new CD needs to be sent to the voters. Correspondingly, both the 
voting server software and the bootable CD need to be maintained.  
c. Smart Cards as Observers 
An observer is a manipulation resistant piece of hardware which is owned by the voter. The idea is 
that the observer is not allowed to directly communicate with the Internet. All the communication 
needs to be forwarded by the voter. The concept of an ‘observer’ has been introduced in (Chaum & 
Pederson, 1992) and has been refined in (Cramer & Pederson, 1993). It has been further developed 
and extended by Schweisgut (2006) and Juels et al. (2005). Here they proposed the application of a 
smart card as an observer. By applying such an approach, one overcomes most of the attacks from 
malicious voters. However, a smart card does not interact directly with the voting server but over the 
vote-casting device. Malware on this device can mount a man-in-the-middle attack and misuse the 
card, for instance, by sending a wrong candidate choice to the smart card or the vote-casting device 
displays a modified ballot. Regarding usability, there are the issues to get such a card and a 
corresponding reader and install and configure the reader. The costs are higher than for existing 
smart cards as it needs to ensure special properties. Further, it needs to be distributed to all voters. 
Regarding maintenance, one has one more component, the smartcard and maybe also the reader to 
maintain.  
d. Code Sheets 
The idea of code sheets is that the voter gets a piece of paper together with the general election 
information via post where each candidate or each party is linked to a particular code. Now, in order 
to cast a voter the voter does not click on the candidate or party of her choice but enters the 
corresponding code. This idea was first proposed by Chaum (2001). Helbach & Schwenk (2007) 
propose to use the code sheets to overcome the secure platform problem and Oppliger et al. (2008) 
proposed an improvement of this technique. This code sheet is sent via ordinary mail and contains for 
each candidate a voting TAN (the origin code) and a confirmation TAN. To overcome vote selling the 
authors introduced in (Oppliger et al., 2008) an additional TAN – the so called finalization TAN. The 
voter enters a corresponding voting TAN instead of choosing a candidate on the PC screen. To verify 
the correctness, she compares the received and displayed confirmation TAN with the one on the code 
   
sheet. In the case of (Oppliger et al., 2008), the voter would confirm the correctness with a third TAN. 
One disadvantage of this approach concerns the user-friendliness which decreases in particular for 
implementing complex ballots. In addition, a trusted procedure to generate and distribute the 
codes/TANs is required. The costs are relatively low as election information letters are sent anyway 
and one can add this code sheet to this letter. Additional requirements for maintenance do not occur.  
Note, this approach works best if vote updating is enabled. 
e. Trusted Computing  
Another approach proposed to overcome the secure platform problem is based on trusted 
computing techniques. In particular, the idea is to use an appropriate security architecture based on a 
security kernel and on Trusted Computing elements. Such a solution is the only one that could 
efficiently overcome malicious software on the voting casting device as well as potential malicious 
voters installing malware on purpose on their device. However, currently, there are still open problems 
with Trusted Computing itself and it is not wide-spread enough. People might have a laptop with 
integrated Trusted Platform Module (TPM) but the security architecture and security kernel are 
missing. A more detailed discussion of this approach is provided in (Alkassar et al., 2006) and 
(Volkamer et al., 2006). This approach provides high security but as it is not yet available one needs 
to conduct further research on it for future elections. If this approach is done properly, there will also 
be no usability concerns. Maintenance can also be solved. However, there are high development 
costs before it can be used. Once the techniques are available, additional cost per elections are 
relatively small.  
f. Individual Verifiability 
As another approach to overcome the secure platform problem, we want to mention individual 
verifiability mechanisms. The idea is that you use one software to prepare a voter and a second one 
to verify that the vote has been properly prepared (encrypted). Plus, you can also do the verification 
with an offline tool. Now, you can still develop malware to alter voters undetected but it requires more 
effort as both software tools need to be manipulated. In addition, an attacker does not know whether 
the voter might go for offline verification. In this case, the manipulation would be detected. 
Furthermore, such a mechanism does not help against malware with the objective to break the 
secrecy of the vote. Therefore, this mechanism should be combined with vote-updating. Regarding 
usability, one must say that there exists almost no research on the usability of verifiability. First papers 
like (Weber & Hengartner 2009) show that it is a huge challenge to provide user-friendly verifiable 
remote Internet voting systems. However, having a verifiable remote Internet voting system you 
automatically get a mechanism to overcome the secure platform problem without any additional costs. 
Correspondingly, there is no additional effort for maintaining a particular mechanism to overcome the 
secure platform problem. Note that this approach does not prevent voters from installing malware on 
purpose.   
g. Comparison 
Similar to the other two dimensions, the secure platform was found to offer a variety of results with 
respect to usability, security, costs, and maintenance. It was noted that again no best solution exists. 
E.g. the security architecture (trusted computing) scored low in usability and yet the costs, security, 
and maintenance were high. This reiterates again the well-known fact that there is normally a tradeoff 
between security and usability. Here one should take the environment into account. For instance, if 
you allow vote casting from Internet cafes you have a much more insecure environment than when 
you have an election in a company with centralized administration and correspondingly much more 
secure platforms. An overview of the analysis is given in Figure 3 (level 5 is the optimum one can 
reach). 
   
 
Figure 3: Trusted Platforms and their applicability for elections 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have focused on special challenges of remote Internet voting and in particular on 
three dimensions of remote Internet voting, namely authentication techniques, client-side voting 
software and secure platform mechanisms. We have provided an overview of different 
implementations in each category. The advantages and disadvantages with regard to security, 
usability, cost, and maintenance of each implementation have also been discussed. It has been 
shown that there are in general conflicts between these different aspects. We further recommend 
balancing these aspects per dimension and also between the dimensions for example, focusing on 
usability for one dimension and focusing on security for another one might result in a system that is 
neither very secure nor very user-friendly. Emphasis has also been given to the fact that not all 
combinations can be implemented together. Consider the following examples; a voter who selects the 
web browser solution is unable to also use the smart card (token) solution unless they have the 
required additional hardware. Use of biometrics also requires a reader. The web browser solution 
does not provide implementation of cryptographic protocols, taking advantage of SSL only. This is 
due to the fact that cryptographic implementations reside on the server side.  
As there is no perfect solution for any of the dimensions one should carefully discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the implementations. For this discussion it is also very 
important to consider the environment in which the remote Internet voting system will be used and 
what the available techniques are in this environment. Rather than deploying smart card and 
biometric solutions purely for remote Internet voting, the voter and the electoral body can consider 
other solutions that are available, such as use of passwords. This is because the initial costs can be 
prohibitive. As a further example, elections carried out in a company would not best be served by the 
bootable CD/DVD solution, since the environment is assumed to be more secure than using a 
computer in an Internet café. As such, the solution deployed will greatly be determined by the money 
available and the environment in use as well as the appropriate combinations and existing hardware 
or software.  
With this overview of different solutions, the discussion of their advantages and disadvantages, it 
should be easier for a voter or the electoral body to decide which implementation is most appropriate 
for their environment.  
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